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BOOK REVIEWS
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Bernard Schwartz.' New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. Pp.xiv, 364. $5.00
Lawyers and law students in the United States will find Professor
Schwartz's brief survey of American constitutional law of some
value and considerable interest despite the fact that the author
addresses himself to British readers.2 As a professor of law in an
American university the author undoubtedly had American
readers in mind as well. From time to time throughout the book
he seems to cast a backward glance in a westerly direction. In
any case there are at least two features that should be of
particular interest to the legal profession both here and abroad,
namely, the use of the comparative method and acute observa-
tions concerning administrative law. That these are the Professor
Schwartz's strong points is, of course, no accident. He is well
known as the author of books on administrative law, not only
in the American but also in the British and French systems,
and he is the Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at
New York University. He has studied and taught both here and
abroad. From his rich experience he presents interesting and
valuable insights concerning British constitutional practice which
one would not usually find in discussions concerning our con-
stitutional law.
The work as a whole, however, seems too slight to be of any
substantial value to lawyers or law students. Perhaps events will
verify the prediction of A. L. Goodhart, the Master of University
,College, Oxford, in his foreword, that the book ". . . will un-
doubtedly take a permanent place in the literature of political
science."3 Perhaps British readers will be satisfied with the
scanty fare. They would get more nourishment, however, from
the various writings of Corwin, Mason, Swisher, and Powell, and
certainly more lively reading from Rodell, and if they have
man-sized appetites both nourishment and delight from Crosskey.
Professor Schwartz divides his materials into two parts. The
first ostensibly deals with the constitutional structure of the
United States, the second with modern developments. This
simple division together with the whole tenor of the book tends
' Professor of Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law,
New York University.
2 Text at xiii.
3 Id. at x.
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to emphasize a widely held misconception concerning constitu-
tional law, that is, the erroneous belief that a rigid constitutional
structure, the foundations of which were laid down in the
eighteenth century, was erected or completed in the course of
the nineteenth century and the earlier years of the present
century, largely, if not entirely, by sound judicial decisions,
which were faithful to the provisions of the original Constitu-
tion and Amendments and that the course of recent decisions
has had the effect of overturning large segments of this structure
contrary to the plans and specifications of the original architects.
There is no question about the great importance of the change in
judical decisions which took place in 1937, but the fact is that
the structural changes that have resulted since that time have
been in the direction of more nearly approaching the original
design than the structure erected in the late nineteenth century
and early twentieth century. "Because laissez faire was con-
stitutionalized it had to be deconstitutionalized," 4 as Ralph F.
Bischoff acutely observed.
Professor Schwartz, although a young man, seems to take an
old-fogey stand on many highly controversial issues without
warning his readers that there is a good deal to be said for the
other side. He swallows whole the old canard that "the Constitu-
tion is what the judges say it is."5 He adopts, it would seem,
the theory that law is merely that which is enforced by courts.
Surely he knows that such views of the law are subject to grave
doubts, to say the very least. Surely he must know that courts
are made up of judges and that judges are men, yet he blandly
quotes from the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780, the famous
language about a "government of laws, and not of men."6 Indeed,
one gets the impression that the author has thrown his materials
together rather hastily and uncritically. A truly acceptable book
on American constitutional law requires, it would seem, years
and years of patient reflexion on the matters barely hinted at in
this work.
One trivial point may deserve mention as indicative of haste
in preparation. The author states: "Unless the courts can in-
tervene in cases where they are violated, the principle of
supremacy of the fundamental law becomes but as 'sounding
brass or a tinkling cymbal.' " Then a footnote reads: "The phrase
used in National Labor Relations Board v. Robbins Tire &
4 Bischoff, The Role of Official Precedents, in SUPREME COURT AND Su-
PREME LAW 80 (Cahn ed. 1954).
5 Text at 130. (Quoting a speech by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
in HENDEL, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT 11 (1951)).
6 Id. at 5.
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Rubber Co., 161 F.2d 798, 804 (5th Cir. 1947) ."7 Surely the author
must know that the language used by the learned judge was
from I Corinthians, Chapter 13, verse 1. It used to be standard
practice to quote from Holy Writ without even using quotation
marks. The current fever to "document" every statement has
certainly led in this instance to a gaffe.
In short, while the book bears the traditional trappings of
scholarship and undoubtedly great pains went into its preparation,
it is far from a satisfactory treatment of American constitutional
law. It would be unfortunate, indeed, if British readers were
to use it as their one and only book on the subject.
Roger Paul Peters*
Tim FORGOTTEN NiN'TH AMENDMENT. By Bennett B. Patterson.,
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1955. Pp. ix, 217. $4.00.
The emergence of the administrative welfare state in the cir-
cumstances of modern mass society has stimulated an increasing
number of books written in defense of individual liberty and
private initiative. The present book belongs to this genre. The
problem, as Patterson sees it, is to redress the excessive and
thoughtless implementation of group rights by subjecting all
legislation to the test of individual natural rights. The total argu-
ment of the book suggests two means of applying this test: (1)
in "Part I," through judicial review of state and federal legislation
on the basis of the Ninth Amendment, and (2) in "Part II,"
through the activation of the traditional American commitment
to liberty and self-disciplined initiative. Presumably this means
would reflect itself in the condition of legislation. The value of
the book lies primarily in the mass of information it offers con-
cerning the legislative and judicial history of the Ninth Amend-
ment. Mr. Patterson has collected and analyzed the court de-
cisions (state and federal) that touch this amendment.2 And
more importantly he has made readily available the debates on
this amendment as they occurred in the Constitutional Con-
vention and the early sessions of the Congress. With regard to
the latter, this work contains the complete Annals of Congress
for the period March 3, 1789 to March 3, 1791.
After noting this valuable feature of the book, however, one
may doubt whether the over-arching argument which draws
7 Id. at 11 n.2.
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1 Member of the Texas Bar.
2 Text at 27.
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this information together possesses a like value. Unfortunately
the argument of Mr. Patterson never jells into complete in-
telligibility. Where it does not exist as sheer assertion of
political faith ("Part II"), it proceeds by way of a constitutional
interpretation whose conclusion rests on a questionable minor
premise ("Part I"). The reviewer is sympathetic to any argu-
ment that exposes the dangers of the collectivist legislation that
is slowly eroding our traditional liberties. He is known, that is to
say, as a conservative. Consequently it is with reluctance that he
criticises a book devoted to the defense of those traditional
liberties. But the fact remains that Mr. Patterson has only
confused important issues and made his own position less tenable
by dressing it in a political theory which however venerable is
still quite ancient and outdated. De Tocqueville, the prophet of
the "Mass Age," has warned us that "A new science of politics
is indispensable to a new world.' 3 Mr. Patterson has succeeded
in giving us only a melange of nineteenth century laissez faire
theory and eighteenth century contractarianism.
The basic position advanced in the book is that the Ninth
Amendment exists as a statement of the basic philosophy of
inherent natural rights and constitutes, within the Constitution,
an assertion that the rights listed therein are not exhaustive.
With this point one could hardly argue. More debatable, however,
are certain sub-arguments within this basic one. Fundamental
to Patterson's point is the argument that the Ninth Amendment
has to do with individual rather than group rights. The only real
evidence offered for this position is an assertion that the Ninth
Amendment is the individual rights counterpart of the general
welfare clause which asserts the government's obligation to
protect group rights.4 No argument is offered to prove this point.
Moreover, other sections of the book raise the question of what
Mr. Patterson means by individual as distinct from group rights,
since under this rubric such disparate rights are subsumed as:
privacy, right to strike, right to work, right to participate in
government,5 religious freedom and property. 6 He asserts that
"...human rights are the product of the growth of civilization.17
A second sub-argument basis to the fundamental point is con-
tained in the position that from the beginning the Ninth
Amendment applied to the states and gave the Federal Govern-
ment authority to strike down state legislation contrary to in-
3 DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 7 (1900).
"1 Text at 57.
5 Id. at 55-56.
* Id. at 69.
* Id. at 53.
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dividual inherent rights. Now if Mr. Patterson had argued that
in virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment the Ninth applied to
the states his position would be recognizable. But his argument
is that the Ninth Amendment is unique in the Constitution in
that by virtue of being a positive assertion of a philosophy rather
than a restrictive clause after the manner of the first Eight
Amendments, it must apply to all governments. The incom-
prehensive assertion is made that if the Ninth were to be in-
terpreted as applying solely to the Federal Government, after
Barron v. Baltimore, then we would have to admit that the state
governments have no duty to respect individual rights.8 There
is deep confusion here concerning the function of a constitution.
After his essay on constitutional interpretation in "Part I," Mr.
Patterson describes in "Part II" the political theory upon which
he conceives the Ninth Amendment to be based. This philosophy,
advanced by way of a profession of faith rather than an organized
analytical theory, turns out to be nineteenth century in-
dividualism replete with the usual coercive theory of the
origins of authority, the contractarian theory of the surrender
of rights to government 9 and a clear suggestion of J. S. Mill's
distinction between the private and public areas of life.'0 A
review is not the place to engage in a discussion of such basic
theoretical concepts. It is unfortunate, however, that Mr. Pat-
terson's real insight into the evolving character of rights which
led him to insist that we cannot restrict our constitutional rights
to those known in 1789, should not have led him to see that a
political theory evolved to solve the problems of a sparsely
settled agricultural people can by no means handle the problems
of a modern, integrated, complex mass society. Daniel Boorstin
has observed in his Genius of American Politics that the habit
of assuming that our political theory is a "given" concerning
which there can be no real discussion can no longer serve as an
excuse for not engaging in hard, laborious thought. Mr. Patterson
has permitted himself to operate on the assumption that our
Constitution contains within it a permanently true theory of
political life.
As a final point, Mr. Patterson gets himself into difficulty by
virtue of not paying sufficient attention to the consistency of his
thought. In "Part I," to make his point, he proceeds largely on
the basis of a mistrust of the people: they raise the danger of
majority tyranny. This begets the call to government, particularly
to the courts, to restrict this tendency by an aristocratic review
8 Id. at 36.
9 Id. at 72.
10 Id. at 57.
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of the will of the people. In "Part II," in his praise of the
traditional American individualism, he gets himself involved in
an appeal to the American people to live up to their historic
destiny. Presumably this will mean democracy with a government
that has largely withered away under the onslaughts of virtue
among the people. Now Mr. Patterson must make up his mind
where our salvation lies: in the courts, i.e., in aristocracy, or in
a rejuvenated people, i.e., in democracy. Whichever solution we
choose will produce public policy of vastly different proportions
and significance.
Stanley J. Parry C.S.C.*
HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW. By Robert E. Sullivan.' New
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955. Pp. xix, 556. $8.50. Dean
Sullivan has accomplished in remarkable degree the almost im-
possible task of writing a lawbook that is of interest to the
practicing lawyer, and at the same time is understandable by
laymen. As stated in his preface, this book is ". . . for oil and gas
lawyers, for oil people who are not lawyers, for lawyers who are
not oil people, and for persons interested in the legal aspects of
the oil and gas industry."'2 With this objective in mind, the author
has couched his text in relatively simple English, and has taken
pains to avoid the kind of legal terminology that is apt to confuse
those not versed in the law.
This has not impaired the value of the book to the lawyer who
practices in the field of oil and gas. While he has chosen to use
the modest title Handbook, Dean Sullivan has managed to con-
dense into a single volume of 556 pages a truly comprehensive
treatment of his subject. Even the more obscure legal problems
that are rarely encountered in the petroleum operations are not
ignored. With the exception of the more important or "landmark"
cases, court opinions are not reviewed individually in any detail.
However, statements contained in the text are supported by foot-
notes referring to the cases, and these references are quite
adequate to serve as a basis for further research by the lawyer
who is interested in pursuing a particular point of law.
In considering oil and gas law as a subject, it must be borne
in mind that it is not a separate branch of the law, in the same
sense as the law of contracts, the law of torts, or the principles
* Head, 'Political Science Department, University of Notre Dame.
1 Dean, Montana State Law School. Former Associate Professor, Notre
Dame Law School.
2 Text at vii.
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of equity constitute distinct subjects. Since oil and gas are fluid
minerals that are found within land, they necessarily involve
the law of real property. In the vast majority of instances, petrole-
um operations are conducted under leases obtained from land-
owners, and therefore the law of contracts is of vital concern.
To a considerable extent, conflicts of interest that arise between
landowners and lessees are resolved by the courts on principles
of equity. Most of the major producing states have adopted
statutes which entrust the regulation of oil and gas production
to governmental agencies, thereby bringing administrative law
into play. Hence, oil and gas law is composed of those portions
of property law, contract law, equity, administrative law, etc.,
that are specifically applicable to oil and gas.
Recognizing that an understanding of the salient facts is a
prerequisite to an understanding of legal principles, Dean Sul-
livan begins with a discussion of the geology of the petroleum
reservoir and the engineering aspects of oil and gas production.
Unfortunately, today's knowledge concerning the nature of oil and
gas reservoirs was not available to the courts that were obliged
to formulate rules of law applicable to these fluid minerals. For
many years after the commercial production of oil began in
1859 with the drilling of Colonel Drake's well in Western
Pennsylvania, courts were obliged to base their decisions on
suppositions now known to be erroneous. Ignorance of the
facts largely explains the many conflicts and apparent incon-
sistencies in the court decisions that developed the common law
applicable to oil and gas.
In his discussion of the nature of the landowner's interest in
oil and gas beneath his land, Dean Sullivan notes the variety of
rules that have been devised by the courts of the producing states.
Oddly enough, while widely different rules prevail in the various
jurisdictions on the basic question of title to oil and gas existing
beneath the surface of land, the courts of the producing states
have been unanimous in their adoption of the "rule of capture,"
holding that the owner (or the lessee) of the land from which
oil or gas is produced acquires title thereto, regardless of its
source.
3
. As might be anticipated, the topic most extensively treated iv
the Handbook is the oil and gas lease. A great many, and perhaps
most, of the court decisions concerning oil and gas involve the
interpretation of provisions contained in leases. Despite the ever
increasing number of special provisions that are incorporated iv
oil and gas leases, situations arise that are not specifically covered
- Id. at 45.
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Therefore, over the years the courts have developed a very con-
siderable body of "implied covenants" on the part of oil and gas
lessees. Moreover, almost from the inception of the producing
industry, courts have shown a marked tendency to construe the
oil and gas lease strictly against the lessee and liberally in favor
of the lessor, bearing in mind that the form of the lease is usually
selected by the lessee. Here again, however, there is such lack
of uniformity in the court decisions that a particular lease
provision may be given quite different meanings in different
jurisdictions. Dean Sullivan has taken care to note these varia-
tions in court decisions as a warning to the unwary.
The comprehensive nature of the Handbook is illustrated by
its treatment of the "conservation statutes" that have been
adopted in most of the major producing states. These statutes are
a comparatively recent development, as few have been in force
longer than twenty years, and their development even now is by
no means complete. Expansion of the petroleum industry, coupled
with more extensive knowledge, has brought realization that the
court-made rules of common law are inadequate to prevent waste,
and to regulate the "correlative rights" of landowners and their
lessees in subsurface accumulations of oil and gas. Because the
modern conservation statutes modify the common law rules in
greater or less degree, they have become an integral part of the
law of oil and gas. Hence, Dean Sullivan has included in his book
an excellent discussion of the nature of the conservation statute
and the means by which it is applied and enforced3
Even the apparently unrelated topic of taxation is included in
the Handbook.5 Many of the producing states have imposed on
producers special levies such as severance or production taxes.
In addition, federal and state income tax laws contain provisions
such as those relating to depletion, intangible drilling costs, and
the like, that are of peculiar interest to the oil and gas operator.
While it would be impossible to incorporate exhaustive treatment
of taxation in a one volume work on oil and gas law, Dean
Sullivan's discussion is quite sufficient to call attention to the
special tax problems of the industry.
Well arranged and well indexed, Dean Sullivan's Handbook
should prove extremely useful to the practicing lawyer. To those
not trained in the law but who are interested in oil and gas, the
book will be understandable and informative.
George W. Hazlett*
4 Id. at 251.
5 Id. at 485.
* Member of the Ohio Bar. General Counsel, The Sohio Petroleum Corp.
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THE MoRAL DECISION. By Edmond Cahn. Bloomington: In-
diana University Press, 1955. Pp. ix, 342. $5.00. This is a book
about moral implications that can be found in certain American
legal decisions. Both law and morals, from their differing points
of view, are frequently concerned in the same transaction. For
example, murder, theft, and arson are crimes in law, and they
are also thought to be immoral acts. Fraud and. misrepresenta-
tion are valid defenses to an action on contract, and they are also
blamed as lies against conscience. Professor Caln's purpose in
writing this book was to analyze moral thinking and tendencies
that appear, either expressly or by implication, in the de-
cisions of American judges, and to see to what extent the judges
provide leadership for sound moral theory and practice, and to
what extent they lag behind.2
The second and principal section of the book consists of a
set of reported cases. Professor Cahn's procedure is first to
brief the case, giving the facts, decision, and reasons, and then
to discuss the case from the viewpoint of Professor Cahn's own
thinking about morals. Some of the cases are very famous, for
example the Wagner3 rescue case, and Shelley v. Kraemer,-
some not well known at all. But all of them were chosen, the
author says, for their "prismatic" value, in that they throw
light not only on themselves, but on a whole cluster of moral
situations and problems connected with them.5
The order of the cases follows the chronology of a person's life.
First, problems connected with life itself, and with childhood
("the right to be young," the turntable cases); then various
social relationships, sex, and the family, and business and
government; then a section on "the enlargement of personality";
and finally the question of death.
No attempt will be made here to record all of the author's moral
principles and convictions, but only some of the more interesting.
He believes that sexual intercourse outside of marriage is
morally good (he describes it as "love" without qualification),
and he favors the growing tendency of American law to allow
the "morality statutes" (e.g., fornication) to become dead letters
on the books." Contraception is "one of the important benefac-
tions" of science to the modern world, because it has helped
I Author of TBE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949), THm SuPRaia CoURT AND
SuPrmnE LAw (1954) and others.
2 Text at 3.
3 Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
4 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
5 Text at 4.
6 Id. at 89.
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"... to liberate society from an age-old incubus: the doctrine...
that love is primarily a reproductive activity. .... 7
Professor Calm favors easy divorce, freed from the "ad-
versary" situation in which legal tradition and procedure have
fixed it. The idea of the "guilty" party and the "innocent" party
should vanish from the law. More and more in the United States
marriages do not break up in an atmosphere of recrimination
and hostility, but out of a motive of optimism: the parties want
to marry somebody else and try it again." The bad legalism
that surrounds marriage and divorce is attributed to the
"mercantilist" view of marriage and to the fact that domestic
relations law has mostly been made by men with their senti-
mentality combined with an ownership attitude. In the whole
matter of domestic relations, Professor Cahn thinks the law has
lagged behind the evolving morals of the people.9
But the situation is different in business and political morality.
In these areas the judges have shown genuine leadership and a
concern to elevate standards of public conduct. This concern
is seen, for example, in the tendency of courts to make more
stringent the relations of trusteeship, and to grant legal relief
in situations which in an earlier day would have been regretfully
described as "mere moral obligations" and therefore unenforce-
able. The "moral" obligation and the "legal" obligation are
tending more and more to coincide. Again, the courts will not
put themselves at the service of lesser bodies to give legal force
to agreements and arrangements that lag behind the moral im-
plications of the Constitution. Thus the federal court refused
to enforce restrictive covenants in Shelley v. Kraemer,'° and the
discriminatory practices of the Brotherhood of Railroad Fire-
men." Professor Cahn thinks our judges are still overly lenient
in their attitude towards tax evaders. It is still not quite clear
that cheating the government is an offense "involving moral
turpitude." The opinion of the author is that payment of taxes
is an obligation of conscience, and that fraud on the government
is as- morally blameworthy as fraud on an individual.' 2
The author's own moral discussion of the "principal cases" is
often rather circuitous, and not always clear; but nearly always
he does return to the point. In fact the moral discussions are
really highly personal essays, employing the author's own logic,
* Id. at 92-93.
8 Id. at 121.
9 Id. at 109.
1o Id. at 162.
11 Id. at 158.
12 Id. at 173.
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his own terminology and distinctions, and illustrating his own
personal moral opinions. In the first section of the book he
explicitly repudiates "authorites" of any sort, particularly "ec-
clesiastical." There are scattered references, to the Bible, par-
ticularly the Old Testament, to Aristotle and Plato and others,
but the references are always illustrative of opinions held by
the author on grounds of his own personal insights. Thus Pro-
fessor Cahn is a personal essayist in this matter, not a professional
moralist in any usual sense of that term; he does not belong to any
school nor follow any system. He analyzes his selected problems
in the light of his own moral thinking.
Yet there is some theorizing in the first section of the book,
where he discusses questions of the nature and origin of morality
and of the distinction between law and morals. And much of this
theoretical material reflects study and thinking familiar to every
student of ethics. He rejects the idea that morals are equivalent
to mores. He rejects positivism and traditionalism as origins
of morality. The "external policing" of precepts and command-
ments must give way to the "internal policing" of "conscience."
The important act in the moral order is the act of "decision," and
"good habits" are of great value in helping to make one's moral
decisions stable and trustworthy.
If mores, traditions, precepts, do not provide a standard for
good conduct, then where is that standard to be found? Pro-
fessor Cahn finds it in "the moral constitution." "Without the
moral constitution it is difficult to see how there could be any
moral legislation or any specific moral decisions."'' 3 But what is
"the moral constitution" ?-The moral constitution of what?-
The author does not define it or describe it with clarity. Seeming-
ly, the moral constitution must be within the man himself, the
moral agent, the portion of his total make-up that has reference
to the good. Thus the moral constitution would include the native
tendencies and inclinations of the man towards the good, and the
judgments he makes about the good in particular, and the de-
cision to act in accordance with his judgment.
If this brief analysis of the moral constitution hits at all close
to Professor Cahn's understanding of it, then it would seem that
his norm of the "moral constitution" is not far removed from the
norm of the scholastic moralists, based on "human nature."
However, as so often in moral discussions, disagreement may
arise concerning the application of the norm. No reader could
take exception to Professor Cahn's high standards and ideals





courts for strengthening the idea of trust in business relation-
ships, for refusing to enforce prejudice, for elevating standards
of good citizenship. And with equal right he blames the courts
where they seem to be guilty of perpetuating vestiges of an
"arm's length" morality.
But the entirety of Professor Cahn's section on sexual and
family morality seems completely wrong from the viewpoint of
the moral constitution itself. This criticism is directed not so
much towards the legal questions raised-whether divorce should
be "adversary" or not, hard to get or easy to get, whether judges
should enforce morality statutes or not-but to the center of the
auhor's understanding of sex and marriage.
For example, it is really difficult to believe that his attitude
towards "love" can actually be what he says it is. He makes no
distinction between love and lust, between what he describes
as "flaring and flickering affairs" and a lifetime of devotion. The
most he will say for the permanence of love is that "most Ameri-
cans" prefer a union that is "lifelong" and "monopolistic," or at
least "provisionally so.''14 His attitude towards sexual morality
indicates a surprising lack of understanding of the psychological
and spiritual depth and profundity of the sexual act, of its
significance in the human constitution, and of its corresponding
importance in the moral constitution.
Similar criticisms could be made of his ideas regarding mar-
riage and the family. He holds that contraception has done away
with the old idea that "love" is primarily a reproductive activity.
This seems an example of reasoning in reverse-like arguing
that airplane crashes prove that the purpose of air transport is
not to get passengers where they are going. It is perfectly obvious
that sexual union is intended for reproduction-for much else
besides, of course, but certainly for that primarily. Then con-
traception comes along afterwards and prevents the process from
achieving its result.
Thus deep questions are raised by the author's opinions:
questions of the nature of man, of the soul of a child, of parent-
hood, all of the old verities. That is why the total effect of 'the
book is disquieting, combining as it does a thoroughly meritorious
and enlightened view of man in his secondary relationships, with
more fundamental considerations where the opinions of the
author seem almost corrupt.
Charles E. Sheedy, C.S.C.*
14 Id. at 93.
* Dean of the College of Arts & Letters, University of Notre Dame.
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N=N MEN. By Fred Rodell.1 New York: Random House, 1955.
Pp. xii, 338. $5.00. We live in an age in which the public at large
is being invited to explore and share in what were once the
hidden mysteries of the specialized professions. It is no longer
enough to hope that our scientists will tame the atom; we must
be able to understand the general operation of a nuclear reactor
and know something of the effect of radioactivity upon the muta-
tion of our genes. The theory of games is not only an abstruse
branch of higher mathematics; it is also a proper subject for an
article in a popular magazine. In recommending or selecting a
psychiatrist we are supposed to be able to report whether his
orientation, is freudian or whether he leans to the school of inter-
personal relations and how he feels about the use of the new tran-
quillizers. And it is not only permitted but expected that we can
contribute to a dinner conversation about the relative merits and
dangers of live and killed virus vaccines. In Nine Men, Professor
Rodell has attempted to supply for the hitherto uninformed but
reasonably intelligent layman an understanding of the basic func-
tion that is served by the Supreme Court in our constitutional
democracy.2 That Rodell has the necessary familiarity with the
Court's history, sufficient insight and the capacity to do such a job
is convincingly demonstrated by this book. Whether he will in
fact succeed in persuading any but a tiny minority of his readers
of his central thesis, other than those who come to him already
convinced, is quite another matter.
Rodell, in his highly readable and thoroughly exasperating
fashion, develops as his central theme the proposition that in
deciding the great constitutional cases, the Justices have not in
the past, and will not in the future, "'.. . lay the article of the
Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is chal-
lenged and ... decide whether the latter squares with the for-
mer,' " but rather have reached and will reach their conclusions
on the basis of essentially political considerations. Few lawyers
today will disagree. Too few non-lawyers, at least so my limited
experience indicates, recognize that this is the case and why it can-
not be otherwise. There is, therefore, room and need for a book
such as the one that Rodell tells us he has set out to write. But
since his average reader, for reasons that need not now be ex-
plored, will find these truths startling and, indeed, unpalatable,
it is a crucial condition, for an author who wishes to succeed, to
:. Professor of Law at Yale University Law School. Author of Wos
UNo You, LAwYERs (1939), Fr-Frv. MEN (1936) and numerous articles.
2 Text, Introduction at x.
3 Id. at 137, quoting from United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1935).
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win his reader's confidence and respect. It is here, I fear, that
Rodell has gone astray.
Rodell, for all his repeated castigation of those of us who see
everything only in terms of black and white, is himself incapable
of any but the most intemperate and intolerant opinions of those
who hold views that differ in the slightest respect from those
he knows are unalterably the only correct ones.
This passion for extremes results too often in statements that
the lay reader may justly consider contradictory and pushes him
also into making pat and unconvincing explorations in order to
avoid further contradictions. Thus, the book opens with what
seems to be a vitriolic attack upon the whole concept of judicial
review, upon the irresponsible and autocratic nature of the Court
("not even the bosses of the Kremlin... wield such loose and long-
ranging and accountable-to-no-one power .... ,,) 4 and upon its in-
ability to take affirmative action (you sometimes wonder whether
he wouldn't like the Court to pass some laws during the off sea-
son). But later on, in what is indubitably the best part of the
book, when he traces the history of the Court by examining its
great decisions against the personality and backgrour ds of the
Justices who made them, he points to several instances where the
Court, for good and sufficient political reasons, has accepted its
inability to cope with the superior power of the executive branch
or of the states. The reader might justly ask for some help in un-
derstanding the problem that the Court faces today in enforcing
its order in the segregation cases over the determined opposition
of many of the southern states but he gets none. And the reader's
confusion is bound to be compounded when having finished the
book he realizes that Rodell doesn't object to the power of judicial
review at all - he wants only that it be exercised to invalidate
the laws he considers objectionable.
To cite another example, Rodell's layman might be be-
wildered when the explanation that what "state police power"
means is ".... the use of state laws to do things that a majority
of the Justices, at any given time, do not strongly disapprove of
the state's doing - nothing more, nothing less,"5 is followed
shortly thereafter by Rodell's obvious approval of Justice Holmes'
battle to prevent the invalidation of laws that seemed "futile or
even noxious" to him.6 And while the close, discerning reader may
gather that Holmes' views in this regard have been accepted
today, he is repeatedly faced with contemptuous references to
4 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 124.
6 Id. at 182.
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"judicial passivists" and to those who "talk of pious self-denial."
So, too, when one has had decision after decision explained
solely on the basis of the fact that this judge represented that
corporation before joining the Court or was born in one section
of the country rather than another, he is likely not to be satisfied
with the claim that when this method does not work it is because
.. . the Justices sometimes seem to change their more lightly or
expediently held political opinions after they have achieved the
security of the Court.' 7 (Emphasis added.) Rodell assures us
that his own "slant toward people," and presumably issues, is
based on his ideas and his ideals, not on petty, personal things."
He seems, however, to find it incredible that the same might
be said of any but a tiny handful of our Supreme Court Justices.
To give examples of how far he goes, he explains Justice Reed's
fine record in consistently voting to uphold the rights of negroes
as due to the desire of a southerner ". . . not to seem guilty... of
racial prejudice."9 (Emphasis added.) And Justice Frankfurter's
concern with procedural matters is ascribed to ". . . his earliest
environment, for Continental education and scholarship are com-
monly more concerned with abstract ideas and patterns of logic
than with down-to-the-dirty-earth problems of living people....",uo
Rodell does not appear the least bit bothered by the fact that he
has told us, only two pages earlier, that Frankfurter came to
this country at the age of twelve.'1
Much of this is simply captious criticism. It reflects, however, the
more serious nature of Rodell's failure. He knows perfectly well
that to demonstrate that judges make political decisions is only
the beginning of analysis. He knows also that the term is so broad
that it covers a host of matters of widely different character and
that the best of our judges have been those who thought deeply
and seriously about the nature of their role in our system of
government and have attempted to act in accordance with the
judicial philosophies that they have fashioned. Unless the views
of these men are fairly presented the reader is not being informed,
he is being tricked. How, for example, can a thoughtful reader
learn that there may be different conclusions about the value of
judicial review as a method of controlling national legislation and
its importance as a restraint on state action when Rodell twice
quotes his principal hero, Holmes, to the effect that our system of
7 Id. at 9.
s Id., Introduction at xi.
9 Id. at 268.
10 Id. at 271.
11 Id. at 269.
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government would survive if the Court lost its power to declare
an Act of Congress void, without either time completing the
quotation?' 2 How, for example, can the layman for whom this
book is written be expected to decide for himself whether it may
not be proper precisely because judges are appointed for life and
legislators elected periodically, for judges to avoid certain cases
because they present "political questions" when Rodell is inter-
ested only in showing how foolish this is since judges constantly
make "political" decisions? 13
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that Rodell's kinship with his
favorite demons, McReynolds, Sutherland, Van Devanter and
Butler is much closer than that with his heroes, Holmes, Brandeis,
Cardozo and Stone. The Court has the power, it should use it for
the general good and not trouble itself with petty philosophical
problems about whether the possession of absolute power requires
that it be cautiously employed - just what McReynolds believed.
The present Chief Justice has already been assigned a place
among the very greatest because of one forthright opinion 14 while
the Court that prepared the way for that opinion and made it
virtually inevitable is denied any credit because it also decided
the Dennis case.15 One need not agree with the Dennis decision
to recognize that this superficial kind of appraisal is completely in-
adequate. But except when he is writing history, this kind of
thinking permeates the book. Until Rodell recognizes that a good
heart, a shrill tongue and a facile pen are no substitute for
troubled cogitation, he will go on wasting his talents.
Lawrence J. Latto*
32 Id. at 20.
3a Id. at 13.
'4 Id. at 323-324.
'5 Id. at 320.
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